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Abstract In the Andapa region of northeast Madagascar,
smallholders cultivating swidden hill rice (tavy) for subsis-
tence are pressing against neighboring nature reserves. A
dominant policy approach to reducing this pressure requires
that smallholders abandon tavy and purchase rice from pro-
ceeds obtained from their environmentally sustainable com-
mercial crops, vanilla and coffee. Economic liberalization pol-
icies have succeeded in stimulating the expansion of these
commercial crops, but have failed to reduce tavy production.
We ask why this dual (subsistence and commercial) produc-
tion system persists.We test two explanatory views: that either
market imperfections deny farmers full entry into the market,
or that internal production goals or socio-cultural norms create
barriers to full market participation. Results support the latter
view, although not for reasons that have been associated with
this view in past studies. We propose a new factor that may
serve as a barrier to full-market immersion among Andapa
tavy farmers, the social relations of property.
Keywords Dual production systems . Swidden .
Subsistence . Self-provisioning . Food security .
Commercialization . Induced intensification . Agricultural
change .Madagascar . Africa
Introduction
Smallholder farmers in the Andapa Region of northeast Mada-
gascar (Fig. 1) practice a dual production system involving
slash-and-burn hill rice (tavy) and irrigated paddy rice for sub-
sistence and vanilla and coffee for themarket. Population growth
has triggered land pressure, spurring the search for new land for
cultivation inside the region’s two nature reserves. The dominant
approach to reducing pressure on these reserves and others
throughout eastern Madagascar proposes redirecting surround-
ing communities into more intensive, reliable, and sustainable
pathways of agricultural development (Erdmann 2003; Kistler
and Spack 2003; Messerli 2000; WWF-Madagascar 2012).
Where irrigable land exists, farmers are encouraged to shift
from tavy to paddy – a pathway that does not require giving up
subsistence production (Messerli 2000; IFAD 2012). Where
irrigable land is insufficient, as in the foothills surrounding the
Andapa Valley, farmers either will have to adopt more labor-
intensive practices within the tavy sector (Styger et al. 2007)
or abandon self-provisioning and purchase rice from the pro-
ceeds of coffee and vanilla sales. Planted compactly, the per-
manent rooting of these cash crops binds the soil, permitting
the viable and sustained use of steep slopes.
Madagascar liberalized its markets in the late 1980s to the
early 1990s, tacitly supporting the cash-crop pathway. Some
Andapa farmers responded by enlarging their commercial fields.
None, however, enacted subsistence substitution, giving up rice
production to purchase this staple with profits from vanilla and
coffee crops. Tavy still dominates the landscape.
This case invokes the long-standing, unresolved question of
why many smallholders around the world maintain self-
provisioning rather than integrate fully into the market econo-
my (Netting 1974; Goodman and Redclift 1982; Van der Ploeg
2008; Schmook et al. 2013). The problem may be framed by
two broad perspectives, labeled here as exogenous and
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endogenous views. The exogenous view holds that small-
holders are Bpenny capitalists,^ constrained from commercial-
izing fully by market imperfections or capitalist institutions of
exploitation (Vogt 1969; Goodman and Redclift 1982; Dorward
et al. 1998). The endogenous view maintains subsistence pro-
duction logics or cultural norms contextualizing smallholder
economies impede full-market immersion (Hyden 1980; Turner
and Brush 1987; Turner and Ali 1996).
This study explores why tavy persists in Andapa from these
two perspectives. We conclude that a cultural norm ensuring
subsistence security is at work, but find the explanations
commonly associated with this endogenous thesis irrelevant to
the Andapa case. We hypothesize that part of the explanation
may reside in the social relations of property (Ferguson 1985,
1990), with implications for current development policies.
The Persistence of Subsistence-Market (Dual)
Production Systems
The exogenous view embodies two different interpretations
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Fig. 1 The Andapa region
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Neoclassic economists assert that smallholders are entrepre-
neurs-in-waiting, denied full access to markets by imperfect
conditions. Under favorable conditions farmers engage the mar-
ket, raising aspirations, and ultimately move to market optimiz-
ing behavior (Schultz 1964; Popkin 1980; Mellor and Desai
1985). Impediments to that transformation are attributed to mar-
ket failures, such as inadequate input and credit markets, or
factors that cause high transaction costs, such as inadequate
transportation (Dorward et al. 1998; Kherallah and Kirsten
2001). Political economists, in contrast, argue that capitalist sys-
tems, especially as practiced historically in Africa, seek to main-
tain dual production systems in order to obtain a cheap supply of
farm goods by having farmers feed themselves (Bernstein 1977;
Goodman and Redclift 1982; Peet 1991). Together, these argu-
ments place the explanation for self-provisioning on factors ex-
ternal to the smallholder. The political economy interpretation is
not tested in this study as we have no means to address it
empirically.
The endogenous view highlights factors embedded within
smallholders themselves that make a shift to full-market produc-
tion a difficult or unwanted transition. One set of interpretations
holds that smallholders maintain a production logic that empha-
sizes drudgery of labor (e.g., Chayanov 1966; Barlett 1976),
avoidance of risk to base consumption needs (e.g., Lipton
1968), or aspirations other than profit-maximization (e.g.,
Brookfield 1984). As such, the intensification of subsistence
production is induced by increasing demand (e.g., population
growth) in the face of land constraints (Boserup 1965; Turner
and Brush 1987). This process may push subsistence farmers
into dual systems (or even full-market immersion) when
commercial productionmeets consumption goals more efficient-
ly than subsistence (Boserup 1981; Tiffen andMortimore 1992).
Another set of interpretations holds that subsistence is
enmeshed in a group behavior aimed at protecting internal
values and socio-cultural norms that preserve autonomy
(e.g., Van der Ploeg 2008), equity (e.g., Wolf 1957; Foster
1965), rights to minimum subsistence (e.g., Scott 1976;
Hyden 1980), or socio-religious systems (e.g., Rappaport
1984). In these cases, the move to full-market cropping re-
quires changes in these values, norms, or institutions. Missing
in this version is the role that social relations of property
(Ferguson 1985, 1990) may play in securing subsistence.
The Andapa Context
The Political Economy of Commercial Production
In the late 1800s, French and Reunionese colonial settlers
established coffee and vanilla plantations in the sparsely-
populated Andapa Valley, drawing in Malagasy immigrant
labor dominated by the Tsimihety ethnic group (Fig. 1)
(Neuvy 1989). These workers soon quit, claimed land in the
surrounding foothills, and adopted the dual production system
that remains today (Cabanes 1982). By 1925, these small-
holders produced 90 % of Andapa’s vanilla, forming a corner
of the Bvanilla triangle^ (Fig. 1: inset) that soon became the
largest producer of high-quality bourbon vanilla in the world
(Portais 1972). Middlemen bought, processed and sold the
commercial crops to French trading companies (Althabe
1968). Smallholders in the irrigable Andapa Valley proper
(Fig. 1) eventually shifted their commercial sector into paddy,
becoming a Brice bowl^ for northeast Madagascar. Those in
the surrounding foothills (the subject of this study) maintained
coffee and vanilla production (Neuvy 1989).
Madagascar’s post-colonial socialist drift in the 1970s
witnessed strong commodity regulations. The state set excep-
tionally low rice prices to subsidize its urban population, but
black markets forced deregulation by the mid-1980s (Pryor
1990). The state controlled the coffee and vanilla sectors through
amarketing board, CAVAGI (Caisse de Commercialisation et de
Stablilisation des Prix duCafé, de laVanille et duGirofle), which
set relatively low, but steady, farm-gate prices (Krivonos 2004).
The state also colluded with Comoros and Réunion to create a
vanilla cartel that kept exports low and international prices ex-
ceptionally high, garnering high taxes (Melo et al. 2000).
During a mid-1980s fiscal crisis, the IMF pressured Mad-
agascar to liberalize its economy, forcing CAVAGI to release
its control of coffee by the late 1980s and vanilla by 1994
(Pryor 1990; Krivonos 2004). Coffee farm-gate prices did
not change significantly until global prices rose in the mid-
1990s and collapsed again in 2001–02 (Fig. 2). Vanilla prices
initially rose, but without CAVAGI to hold down supply, they
soon fell again (Cadot et al. 2009).
In the early 2000s, political unrest and destructive cyclones
in Indonesia andMadagascar reduced global supply, and prices
reached nearly $500/kg USD. Global competitors quickly en-
tered the market and consumers switched to cheaper, artificial
vanillin, causing prices to plunge again (Fig. 2).
Land Management
The earliest Tsimihety immigrants established the land tenure
system that endures today. Farmers cleared plots on the lower
reaches of a watershed and claimed ownership of the upper
reaches as well, thereby establishing large landholdings with
the most irrigable land for paddy. Subsequent immigrants had
to confirm that no prior claims encumbered a particular wa-
tershed before establishing their claim. Newer immigrants
have had to purchase land.
Land resources are organized in a mixed private and
extended-family system. Tavy and paddy fields are usually
owned and managed at the family level, often embracing multi-
ple households spanning two or three generations. Family elders
temporarily allocate fields to individual households for tavy or
paddy, but grant parcels as private property to adults (males and
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females ~16 years of age) for commercial crops. In this way,
most farmers have full ownership over a small amount of land
and contingent access to more, with families operating as the
encompassing land management unit. When elders die, families
divide the tavy and paddy land amongst the next generation,
both males and females. If the recipient already has adult chil-
dren, that subsection of land continues to be managed by an
extended family. Single-household recipients manage their land
as private property until their own children come of age, at which
point they transform into multiple-household families again.
Tavy is managed in a short-fallow system (typically 1:3 to 1:7
crop to fallow years) with minimal attention during fallows
(Laney 2002). Paddy fields are cultivated twice a year where
water is sufficient. Landowning families typically manage these
fields in the main cropping season, but may rent them during the
second season, usually based on a 50/50 sharecropping arrange-
ment. Vanilla vines are wound around short, densely-planted
support trees. They require hand-fertilization, as natural pollina-
tors do not exist outside the orchid’s home range. Flowering
season extends several weeks, but each flower lasts less than a
day, demanding several hours of attention each morning. Coffee
fields, of the Robusta variety, are typically monoculture, al-
though some are planted among remnant forest trees for shade.
Data, Farm Family Typology, and Methods
Socioeconomic Data
This study was conducted in four villages in the foothills ad-
jacent to the Andapa Valley: Mandena, Betsomanga,
Befingotra and Andilandrano (Fig. 1). These villages repre-
sent the range of agro-ecological conditions and cropping pat-
terns found in the region. For example, Mandena has relative-
ly high population densities, small farms, and a focus on va-
nilla, while Betsomanga has lower population densities, larger
farms, and an emphasis on coffee (Table 1).
Over 300 household interviews were conducted in these
villages in 1996–1998 and 2003. Structured questionnaires
were used to collect family demographic and production histo-
ries, including land ownership, cropping patterns, outputs and
farm-gate prices going back to 1987. Most interviews included
the husband and wife and took most of a day. Unstructured
discussions built a broader understanding of family circum-
stances. Commodity price information was also collected from
processor/exporter business records in the Andapa Valley.
The unit of analysis for these data is the family, which aligns
with the land management unit. In order to make multiple-
household families comparable to single ones, the data are
normalized on a per-household basis. For example, if three
households managed nine ha in total, the family is recorded
as owning an average of three ha per household, and that figure
is used to compare farm sizes across all families. Thus, the
300+ individual households reduce to 155 families.
Farm Family Typology
Families are classified into types based on two attributes: farm
size and level of commercial production. Land-rich families
own ≥5 ha per household; land-poor, <5 ha. Families maintain-
ing at least 1500 commercial plants (coffee and vanilla) per
household, or increasing their commercial field sizes by more
than 500 plants per household over the 1987 to 1997 time
period, engage in high levels of commercial activity (high
comm.). Those not meeting either threshold constitute low
levels of commercial activity (low comm.). Four farm family
types are recognized: Type 1, land rich and high comm.; Type
2, land poor and high comm.; Type 3, land rich and low comm.;
and Type 4, land poor and low comm. (Table 2; Fig. 3).
Methods
We assess whether the persistence of self-provisioning in





































Fig. 2 Andapa Farm-Gate Prices.
Average price within a season.
Sources: 1987–2003:
Ramandriabe Ltd., Andapa and
DUBOSC R & Cie., Andapa;
2004–2010: Key informant:
Pascaline Lahady Charlotte;
MGA = Malagasy Ariary; 1 USD
= ~1100 MGA in 1987; 5000
MGA in 1997; ~1800 MGA in
2007
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using: (1) two simplified conceptual family budget models
that compare the profitability of full-market immersion versus
self-provisioning; (2) tests of subsistence pressures by family
type; (3) on-site observations and other studies in the region;
and (4) perception analysis.
Family Budget Models
A full-market budget model estimates revenues and expenses
for an average-sized household (2 adults, 2 children over and 3
children under the age of 10) enacting full subsistence substitu-
tion, purchasing all of its rice with proceeds from its commercial
production. We base the parameters of this model on Type 2
families whomanaged, in 2002, an average of 2600 commercial
plants per household with its own labor (Table 2; Fig. 3). This is
a conservative figure since some Type 2 units actually managed
up to 3500 plants, along with small tavy fields (Fig. 3).
A self-provisioning budget model estimates revenues and
expenses under a prototypical dual production system. Model
parameters assume that the same average-sized household cul-
tivates 1500 commercial plants, 0.8 ha of tavy, no paddy, and
again relies on its own labor.1 This level of commercial pro-
duction lies at the low end of what Type 1 families typically
managed and at the high end of what Type 3 families typically
cultivated over the study period (Fig. 3). This level of tavy
production does not achieve food self-sufficiency. The model
household purchased 25–35 % of its subsistence rice in 1987
and 40–50 % in 2007 as tavy yields declined.
Model revenues equal the total value from the three crops:
vanilla, and coffee and tavy (#ha * kg/ha * farm-gate price/kg
+/− transportation costs).2 Commercial cropping patterns
(vanilla:coffee ratios, Table 1) and yields (Table 3) are based
on reported averages in each village. Tavy yields for 2007 are
estimated from a linear projection of each village’s annual
average reported yields between 1987 and 2002.
Vanilla and coffee farm-gate prices are based on green, not
processed, commodities. Average prices for the Andapa Re-
gion (Fig. 2) account for CAVAGI manipulations and the cut
taken by middlemen. Transportation costs, which vary by
each village’s proximity to the Andapa Valley, lower those
prices by about 1 % in Mandena, 5 % in Befingotra/
Andilandrano, and 15 % in Betsomanga.3 Transport costs
augment the value of rice in each village by these same per-
centages, based on the assumption that, to replace their culti-
vated rice, families would purchase it from the Andapa Valley.
Input costs are not included in the valuations because farmers
do not purchase amendments (e.g., fertilizers) for any of their
commodities.
Model expenses include the cost of rice (subsistence needs
not fulfilled by their own production), as well as a typical
Bbundle of goods^ that a household purchases tomeet its basic
needs.4 The bundle includes items such as cooking oil and
clothes, but omits others such as school fees, medical ex-
penses, and obligations to support family ceremonies. Bundle
expenses were available in 1987 and 1997, but not 2007.
Several budget simulations are developed to compare how
the two production systems fare under different market and
environmental conditions. Budgets under 1987, 1997 and
2007 price conditions avoid vanilla’s extreme upward price
swing and capture the overall trends as the price differential
between subsistence rice and the commercial crops narrowed
over those 20 years (Fig. 2). The 1987 budgets illustrate the
impact of the state’s socialist-era price manipulations, while
the 2007 budgets represent the combined impact of relatively
1 Approximately 60% of families across all study villages relied solely on
tavy (no paddy) for rice production.
2 Farmers count plants, not hectares. Field size conversions are based on
3300 vanilla plants and 1100 coffee plants per ha.
3 Farmers typically carry their own crops to market, but transportation
costs were considered since injuries or other circumstances can force
them to incur these costs.
4 Based on a socioeconomic survey conducted by WWF-Andapa in
1995. An average-sized family (see text) consumes 1100 kg of rice per
year (adults: 220 kg; children <10 year: 110 kg; teen 10–16 years:
165 kg.). The ‘bundle’ includes: salt, sugar, oil, kerosene, soap, blankets,
and clothes.
Table 1 Cropping patterns by village













Mandena 160 3.3 1:5 80 % 2 4:1 1400
Befinogtra 120 3.5 1:6 30 % 2 2:1 800
Andilandrano 75 7.5 1:8 20 % 2 2:1 1000
Betsomanga 110 5.3 1:7 60 % 1 1:6 1100
All figures refer to 1997 conditions
HH Household, FAM Family (land management unit), CP Commercial Plants (vanilla and coffee)
a ratio based on number of plants
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low commodity prices and high rice prices after market liber-
alization. Separate budgets for each study village account for
village-level variability in vanilla:coffee planting ratios,
yields, and farm-gate prices, although Befingotra and
Andilandrano were sufficiently similar to aggregate the two
villages. Finally, to account for environmental risk, a separate
set of Blow-yield^ budgets was developed for each date and
village, assuming that commodity yields were exceptionally
low and rice yields remained average. While the low-yield
figures are based on recorded occurrences, they did not nec-
essarily occur in the 3 years in question. These budgets are
Bwhat-if^ scenarios, with 2007 exemplifying a worst-case sce-
nario with both low yields and poor market prices.
Subsistence Pressure
We analyze subsistence pressures through demographic stress
and food self-sufficiency. Chi-squared tests evaluate the de-
gree of association between commercial-crop expansion and
two types of demographic pressures: rapid population growth
and new adults. Between 1987 and 1997, nearly all families
experienced population growth. Families that added at least
three new people over those 10 years constitute rapid growth.
A family with a teen turning 16 experienced adult population
growth. A family adding at least 200 new plants was consid-
ered to be expanding commercial activities.
Food self-sufficiency is defined as meeting minimal subsis-
tence requirements through total rice output (tavy plus paddy).
The average total production by each family type was divided
by the number of consumers per household, normalized to adult
equivalents by assuming that children (0–10 years) consume ½
as much, and teens (10–16 years) ¾ as much as adults (see
footnote #4). Families producing more than 220 kg of rice per
adult equivalent met minimum subsistence.
Perception Analysis
Data on family perceptions of their subsistence and commer-
cial activities were generated through an exercise involving 72
of the original 300+ surveyed households across the four
study villages, with representation from each family type
(Type 1=21; Type 2=15; Type 3=15; Type 4=23). An
intended Q-method (Brown 1996) was abandoned as some
villagers perceived it as a form of witchcraft (fanafody gasy;
see Evers 2005). A ranking system was devised instead. A
head-of-household (male or female, depending on availabili-
ty) was presented with 28 cards, each with a statement and
picture, representing a suite of problems that might make a
smallholder unwilling or unable to expand their commercial
crops. The research assistant described each card and asked
the farmer to decide whether it was a Bproblem,^ Bmaybe a
problem,^ or Bnot a problem,^ placing the cards in three piles.
The pile of Bproblem^ cards was spread on a table and the
farmer selected the two most significant problems (given a
Table 2 Farm characteristics by family type
Demographics Paddy sector Commercial sector
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Type 1 33 36 % 2.2 0.4 9.5 (4.1) 70 % 53 % 2630 10 %
Type 2 27 12 % 1.8 0.1 4.1 (2) 50 % 45 % 2670 40 %
Type 3 42 78 % 2.7 1.4 11.2 (5.1) 45 % 40 % 830 18 %
Type 4 53 30 % 1.8 0.4 3.2 (1.8) 50 % 40 % 820 20 %
Type 1=Land rich & High comm
Type 2=Land poor & High comm
Type 3=Land rich & Low comm
Type 4=Land poor & Low comm
HH Household, FAM family (land management unit), CP Commercial Plants (vanilla and coffee)
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Fig. 3 Market engagement by family type
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rank value of one), and the next three (given a rank value of
two). The rest received a rank value of three. The Bmaybe a
problem^ and Bnot a problem^ piles received rank values of
four and five, respectively.5 These data were then aggregated
by family type. For example, Type 1’s most important prob-
lem was the card that received the lowest average rank value
by all Type 1 families (Table 2).
All four family types identified the same eight cards within
their top five problems. The study used discriminant analysis,
a linear regression technique that allows for more than two
categorical dependent variables (Klecka 1980), to determine
whether each family type ranked its problems distinctly. In
this case, a successful discriminant model is able to classify
each family to its type based on how the family ranked the
problems. A high rate of misclassification between two family
types suggests that farmers from these two types ranked their
problems similarly. In this study, a statistically significant
72 % of farmers were correctly assigned to their type,
confirming that family types ranked their problems distinctly
(based on the maximum chance criterion).
Results and Discussion
We assess the factors associated with the exogenous and en-
dogenous views in turn. When a factor is relevant to both
views, such as risk, we discuss it in detail in only one view.
Factors Central to the Exogenous View
Do Andapa farmers maintain self-provisioning because the
rewards from producing coffee and vanilla are inadequate to
support full immersion or because they are constrained from
responding to market signals?
Transaction Costs Transactions costs can lower profits from
commodities while raising the cost of purchased food, creat-
ing a Bprice band^ that can make self-provisioning an
economically rational choice (de Janvry et al. 1991; Key et al.
2000; Cadot et al. 2010). The family-budget models reveal the
impact of 1) low farm-gate prices set by CAVAGI in the so-
cialist era (1987 in the model); 2) middlemen taking as much
as 70 % of the global market price (Cadot et al. 2009; 1997
and 2007 in the model), and 3) transportation costs that lower
the value of commercial crops, and raise the value of subsis-
tence rice, particularly in outlying villages.
Initial results (Table 4 BTotal Crop Value^ in 1987 and
1997; 2007 discussed below) indicate that full-market immer-
sion could have produced a higher total crop value than self-
provisioning in all villages. For example, in 1987 Mandena,
full-market immersion would generate 1,671,000 MGA (Mal-
agasy Ariary) and self-provisioning only 1,046,000 MGA.
Additional results (Table 4 BRemaining Revenues^) for these
same years reveal that full-market producers could cover the
cost of rice purchases and other basic expenses and still be
better off than self-provisioners (Table 4).
The perception analysis produced results somewhat disso-
nant from those of the budget models. Farm family Types 1
(land rich and high comm.) and 3 (land rich and low comm.)
rank Bthe price is consistently too low^ as a significant prob-
lem, signaling dissatisfaction with farm-gate prices even
though the budget models indicate the prices are not a barrier
to commercial expansion. Farmers do not cite middlemen
traders or transportation costs as problems (Table 5).
Market Risk Farmers prioritize safety and reliability when
confronting risk to their subsistence security (Lipton 1968;
Ortiz 1973; Fafchamps 1992; Scoones 1998; Rosenzweig
and Binswanger 1993). Model results for 2007 illustrate the
impact of market risk, representing fallen commodities prices
and a narrowing of the price gap between rice and the com-
mercial crops (Fig. 2). In that year, BTotal Crop Values^ and
BRemaining Revenues^ still indicate superior results for full-
market producers in Mandena and Befingotra/Andilarndrano,
but not in Betsomanga (Table 4) where high transportation
costs and dependence on low-value coffee make full commer-
cialization more vulnerable to low commodity prices.
Environmental Risk All crops in the region experience low
yields under adverse environmental conditions, but tavy is
5 If they chose fewer than five Bproblem^ cards, they had to identify their
two greatest problems and then decide how many cards to give rank two
and three status. If they chose more than eight Bproblems^ cards, the ninth
and above fell in the fourth rank.
Table 3 Average crop yields (kg/
ha) Vanilla Coffee Tavy (Avg yield)
Avg yield Low yield Avg Yield Low yield 1987 1997 2007a
Mandena 1320 825 175 kg/ha 110 975 825 760
Befingotra/Andilandrano 990 500 825 kg/ha 300 825 750 680
Betsomanga 990 165 550 kg/ha 200 775 725 680
a Tavy yields for 2007 are estimated from a linear projection of each village’s annual average yields between 1987
and 2002
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especially susceptible to weather events and bird infestations.
Our study records tavy rice losses of 50–75% in 4 to 5 years out
of ten. Vanilla yields, on the other hand, typically drop by 40–
50 % once every 5 years, and coffee yields less often. Andapa
farmers more commonly rely on commercial revenues, not tavy,
to ensure their subsistence in such instances. Nevertheless, con-
sistent with dual production systems elsewhere, combined sub-
sistence and commercial production may be viewed as a risk-
adverse strategy in the face of potentially low commercial yields
(e.g., Ewell and Merrill-Sands 1987; Ellis 2000).
Model results suggest that environmental risk in the commer-
cial sector is not a significant problem. BRemaining Revenues^
in the low-yield family-budget models indicate that full-market
immersion would be more profitable than self-provisioning in
all villages and all years, except Betsomanga in 2007 when
commercial revenues (759,000 MGA) would cover only 60 %
of the household’s rice needs (1,252,000 MGA) (Table 6). The
potential combined impact of low yields, low commercial
prices, rising rice prices, and high transportation costs maymake
self-provisioning a logical choice in this village.
Researchers note that monetary assessments of risk alone,
as afforded in our budget-models, do not account for personal
and culturally embedded risk judgments and preferences (e.g.,
Douglas 1985; Tucker et al. 2013). While we did not examine
the full realm of risk, perception analysis supports the budget
analyses; no family types citied environmental risk as a sig-
nificant impediment to commercial expansion (Table 5).
Labor Constraints and Labor Markets The family-budget
models reveal that family labor is sufficient to support full-
market production. Nevertheless, Type 2 (land poor and high
comm.) and 3 (land rich and low comm.) families perceive a
labor shortage and express the need to hire labor to support
such a transition (Table 5).
Cross-farm, but no off-farm, labor markets existed in the
villages over the study time frame. About 20–40% of surveyed
households participated in wage labor on other smallholders’
parcels. In most cases, Type 3 and 4 members worked for Type
1 families. No farmers cited an inability to find workers as a
problem (Table 4). Nor did they express a concern that hired
workers would harm their plants or otherwise not perform ad-
equately (Table 4). Wage laborers did not identify labor con-
straints regarding their own commercial fields (Table 5).
Table 4 Budget comparison
under average yield conditions Self-provisioning (1000 MGA) Full-market immersion (1000 MGA)
1987 1997 2007 1987 1997 2007
Mandena
Total crop valuea 1046 3879 3557 1671 5689 4992
Bundle of goods (24) (92) (n/a) (24) (92) (n/a)
Rice self-provisioned (59) (513) (608)
Rice purchased (24) (342) (490) (83) (855) (1100)
Remaining revenueb 939 2932 2459 1564 4741 3892
Befingotra/Andliandrano
Total crop value 841 4010 2825 1338 5973 3836
Bundle of goods (25) (96) (n/a) (25) 96) (n/a)
Rice self-provisioned (52) (485) (565)
Rice purchased (34) (404) (578) (87) (889) (1143)
Remaining revenue 730 3025 1682 1227 4988 2692
Betsomanga
Total crop value 491 3330 1944 685 4367 1888
Bundle of goods (27) (105) (n/a) (27) (105) (n/a)
Rice self-provisioned (67) (642) (774)
Rice purchased (28) (332) (478) (95) (974) (1252)
Remaining revenue 369 2251 692 563 3288 636
Accounting for transportation costs and production levels at the family labor limit
MGA = Malagasy Ariary; 1 USD = ~1100 MGA in 1987; 5000 MGA in 1997; ~1800 MGA in 2007
a Total Crop Value = Revenue from commercial crops + Value of rice self-provisioned
b Remaining Revenue = Total Crop Value – Bundle – Value of rice self-provisioned – Rice purchased
818 Hum Ecol (2015) 43:811–826
Wages are not too high either. Using 1997 as an example,
the prevailing wage was 5000 MGA/day, or 70,000 MGA for
2 weeks of work. In the vanilla flowering season, one worker
can fertilize a field of about 1000 plants, which could yield a
conservative figure of 1/3 kg of green pods per plant and
generate 2,167,000MGA. Or, that worker could clear a coffee
field of 1000 plants, yielding a conservative ¼kg of coffee per
plant, and generating 1,412,500 MGA.
The perception analysis reveals that family Types 2 and 3
claim to have insufficient household adult labor to expand
their commercial fields, but also note that they reserve their
own labor for rice production (Table 5). These families ef-
fectively admit that subsistence activities create a labor con-
straint for commercial expansion. Type 1 families, many of
whom use hired labor, also note that they reserve family
labor for rice. By prioritizing their family labor for rice,
Table 5 Farmer perceptions of barriers to commercial expansion
FAM TYPE & RANK
1 2 3 4
Farm size / Land: commercial production: Rich high Poor high Rich low Poor low
1. Market Incentive
The price is consistently too low * *
2. Trade and Transportation Transaction Costs
Buyers who come to my village offer too low a price
The market is too far away to carry the harvest
I have no money to hire porters to carry the harvest
3. Risks (market, environmental and other)
Prices rise and fall unpredictably
Rain is not reliable enough
Storms wipe out my market crops
Theft is frequent *
Neighbors’ cattle damage my market crops
Neighbors’ fires damage my market crops
4. Labor
I have no money to hire workers ** * * *
I reserve my labor for rice production ** ** **
There is not enough adult labor in the family * * *
I work for others and have little time left
I have money, but I cannot find workers
Workers damage the plants
My wife is frequently pregnant and cannot work
I or my wife is frequently sick and cannot work *
I have too many obligations to my family that take my time
I have too many obligations to my church or village that take time
There are other activities that I prefer to do with my time
5. Land
I do not own enough land ** **
My land is of poor quality
I have family land, but not enough personal land
I reserve my land for rice production * * ** **
6. Aspirations & Drudgery
Cultivating market crops is more difficult than rice
I have the things that want, and do not need more cash
7. Social leveling
I fear neighbors will use black magic against me
** = Highest (1–2) rank
* = Lower (3–5) rank
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these families create the need for cash for hired labor for
further commercial expansion.
Land Constraints Commercial crops do not require a lot of
space. Even land-poor Type 2 families would only have to
convert 5–15 % of their tavy land to commercial crops to
substitute for self-provisioning. Perception rankings confirm
this observation. Land-poor Types 2 and 4 claim that they Bdo
not have enough land^ but also declare that they Breserve land
for subsistence rice^ (Table 5). Their choice to prioritize tavy
creates the land constraint to commercial expansion. Quality
of land is not a factor either. Key informants confirm that
commercial crops can be grown nearly anywhere, although
they yield better on valley bottoms than on slopes.
Traditional land tenure systems in easternMadagascar have
been shown to impede market engagement, particularly
among cultures that root land deep within their belief systems,
making it difficult for farmers to consider land as a marketable
good (Kistler and Spack 2003). In Andapa it is not uncommon
for individuals to sell or rent their private land. The region’s
traditional land-tenure system may, however, impose a signif-
icant transaction cost on commercial expansion. Family land
is reserved for tavy and commercial fields can only be planted
on private plots. Elders may not be granting enough private
plots to facilitate commercial expansion. In fact, the Malagasy
state has implemented a land registration program designed to
dismantle traditional land tenure systems for that reason
(Evers 2005). To test this proposition, we compare the expan-
sion histories of single- and multi-household families. Single-
household families control all of their land as private property.
Multi-household families only control the land that they have
been gifted by the family elder or purchased personally.
Results indicate that multi-household families were much
more likely to add both adults and new commercial fields than
single ones (Table 7; % FAMs expand CPs), highlighting the
strong association between maturing adults and/or new house-
holds and commercial expansion. Restricting the analysis to
those families who added new adults, multi- and single-
household families were equally likely to expand their com-
mercial fields, suggesting that the land-tenure system in ques-
tion is not a barrier to commercial expansion (Table 7; %
FAMs w/ new adults expanded). The perception analysis sup-
ports this result. No farmers identified family versus personal
land a critical constraint for expanding their commercial fields
Table 6 Budget comparison
under low commercial yield
conditions
Self-provisioning (1000 MGA) Full-market immersion (1000 MGA)
1987 1997 2007 1987 1997 2007
Mandena
Total crop valuea 676 2618 2452 1044 3557 3121
Bundle of goods (24) (92) (n/a) (24) (92) (n/a)
Rice self-provisioned (59) (513) (608)
Rice purchased (24) (342) (490) (83) (855) (1100)
Remaining revenueb 569 1671 1354 938 2610 2021
Befingotra/Andliandrano
Total crop value 430 2127 1668 642 2783 1872
Bundle of goods (25) (96) (n/a) (25) (96) (n/a)
Rice self-provisioned (52) (485) (565)
Rice purchased (34) (404) (578) (87) (889) (1143)
Remaining revenue 319 1142 525 531 1798 729
Betsomanga
Total crop value 239 1858 1241 281 1983 759
Bundle of goods (27) (105) (n/a) (27) (105) (n/a)
Rice self-provisioned (67) (642) (774)
Rice purchased (28) (332) (478) (95) (974) (1252)
Remaining revenue 117 779 −11 159 904 −493
Accounting for transportation costs and production levels at the family labor limit
MGA = Malagasy Ariary; 1 USD = ~1800 MGA in 2007
a Total Crop Value = Revenue from commercial crops + Value of rice self-provisioned
b Remaining Revenue = Total Crop Value – Bundle – Value of rice self-provisioned – Rice purchased
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(Table 5). This interpretation is qualified, however, by the fact
that on a per-adult basis single-household families added larg-
er commercial fields than multi-ones (Table 6; Av #CP added
per new adult). Yet the larger field sizes may be temporary.
Many multi-household families were experiencing such rapid
growth (averaging 0.45 new adults per year vs 0.16 among
single-household families) that to keep pace they needed to
expand their commercial crops at three times the rate of single-
household families. This degree of expansion may have need-
ed more time to play out than is captured in our study.
In sum, results do not support the exogenous view.With the
exception of households in isolated, coffee-dependent
Betsomanga, full-market immersion would have been more
profitable than maintaining dual production despite the pres-
ence of substantial transaction costs and market and environ-
mental risk. Moreover, farmers did not face any of the land,
labor, or capital constraints that might stall that transition.
Factors Central to the Endogenous View
Is a subsistence production logic or a cultural norm held by
smallholders themselves making the shift to full-market pro-
duction a difficult or unwanted transition?We examine several
factors relevant to the two endogenous perspectives.
Induced Intensification Andapa farmers may adhere to a sub-
sistence production logic that favors self-provisioning while be-
ing pushed into commercial-crop expansion by rising subsistence
and land pressures, as documented in other regions of Africa
(Pingali et al. 1987; Tiffen and Mortimore 1992).6 Subsistence
pressures are high inAndapa.Only Type 1 families (land rich and
high comm.), which also cultivate the most paddy, maintained
food self-sufficiency throughout the 1990s (Fig. 4; Table 2). The
other family types began purchasing at least some of their sub-
sistence rice with commercial-crop revenues in the early 1990s,
reaching 20–35% of their rice consumption by 1997. Land pres-
sures are also rising, although commercial expansion is not nec-
essarily linked to these pressures. Chi-square tests reveal
statistically significant relationships between commercial-crop
expansion and both rapid population growth and adult population
growth among the leastmarket-engaged families (Types 3 and 4).
No significant relationships are found among the more market-
engaged Type 1 and 2 families (Table 8).
These results support the interpretation that Type 3 and 4
families (low comm.) are being pushed into commercial expan-
sion, as anticipated by the induced-intensification thesis. How-
ever, the production logics typically used to explain small-
holders’ resistance to the market (e.g., risk minimization, drudg-
ery of labor, or other aspirations) do not apply in the Andapa
case. We treated risk above, concluding that market and envi-
ronmental conditions do not create insurmountable risks to full-
market immersion for most Andapa farmers. Regarding work-
loads, subsistence tavy actually requires more labor than market
crops in terms of both total work hours and toil, especially for
weeding. The perception analysis confirms this assessment.
Type 3 and 4 farmers did not rank drudgery of labor as an
important reason for not expanding their commercial crops
(Table 5). Nor did they reveal any other activity competing for
labor, such as community, church, or leisure activities (Table 5).
Type 1 families (land rich and high comm.) are not being
pushed into the market. They are pursuing the market under
relatively low subsistence and demographic pressures. Type 2
families (land poor and high comm.) have been expanding
their commercial fields independent of demographic pressure
(Table 8) and that shift has undermined their food self-
sufficiency (Fig. 4). At the same time, over half of them
borrowed and rented land for tavy under increasingly unfavor-
able terms. This suggests that, like Type 1 families, Type 2
6 Much of this work describes a transition in which population pressures
induce the intensification of subsistence production first, and only later
drive commercial cropping. In some cases, both subsistence and commer-
cial crops are maintained.
Table 7 Influence of family structure and land tenure on market expansion from 1987 to 97
Family
structure










Av. # CP added
per new adult
Single HH-FAM 96 5.1 54 % 38 % 67 % 1100 800
Multi HH-FAM 65 9.3 80 % 66 % 68 % 975 500
HH Household, FAM Family (land management unit), CP Commercial Plants (vanilla and coffee)
a in 1987

















































Fig. 4 Average total rice output per adult equivalent and minimum
subsistence
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families are pursing the market but resisting or held back from
full-market immersion, a situation that cannot be explained by
the induced-intensification thesis.
Cultural Norms and Values Semi-subsistence communities
may resist the capitalist system or seek autonomy from the
market to avoid relations of dependency and exploitation
(e.g., Wolf 1969; Scott 1985; Ploeg 2008). If Andapa farmers
maintain subsistence for such reasons, families that can fully
meet their needs through self-provisioning might be expected
to engage commercial production the least. Yet Andapa fam-
ilies that produce the most rice per capita (Type 1, Fig. 4) also
manage the largest commercial fields (Fig. 3).
Groups may also harbor egalitarian socio-cultural norms
and social-leveling mechanisms that discourage individuals
from amassing material wealth above a culturally-acceptable
level (Wolf 1957; Foster 1965). In southern Madagascar, for
example, successful families hold parties (bilo) to distribute
wealth in exchange for prestige (Fieloux and Lombard 1987).
No similar phenomenon occurred or was mentioned during
our several extended visits in Andapa.
In other parts of Africa, farmers forego economic opportu-
nities for fear of becoming a target of witchcraft (Platteau
2000). Andapa farmers acknowledge the presence of witch-
craft (fanafody gasy), but they do not cite it as a problem
(Table 5). Conversations with key informants confirmed that
the more commercially engaged, wealthy families are not
specifically targeted with fanafody gasy.7 Perhaps this is be-
cause socioeconomic stratification is accepted in Tsimihey so-
ciety. Customary resource ownership, in which land is held at
the extended family, household, and individual levels, allows
for the accumulation of wealth and prestige (Wilson 1993).
Cultivation practices may be related to socio-religious belief
systems, such as maintaining connections to ancestors through
land and land uses (e.g., Rappaport 1984), as has been demon-
strated in parts of eastern Madagascar (Erdmann 2003). Farmers
in Masoala, for example, Broot themselves^ and establish links
to their ancestors (fombarazana) through production. Tavy may
not be essential to this process, however, as at least one family
established its fombarazana through paddy and vanilla alone
(Keller 2008). The Betsimaraka perform socio-religious prac-
tices when preparing land for tavy but not paddy. Yet, when these
farmers were asked directly why they practice tavy, none referred
to their belief system, emphasizing instead that they had no
alternative (Hume 2006a, b).
The Tsimihety share the tradition of establishing fombarazana
through production (Wilson 1993). But Andapa farmers today
do not appear to be using tavy per se as their means of maintain-
ing spiritual connections. This is evident in the degree to which
farmers borrow and rent land for tavy. In fact, many farmers
actively avoid cultivating tavy on their own land if they can
secure rental land because renting ensures longer fallows and
higher yields on their own land. Rentals last only one season,
preventing them from establishing any connections to that land.8
7 Informants explain that most villagers attend church and do not practice
fanafody gasy. Those who do typically use it to cure sicknesses, prepare
for a new house or a marriage, or encourage events to go as they would
prefer.
8 The impact of borrowing and renting land on socio-religious practices
has not been explicitly investigated (Bloch 1971). Actions that establish
tanindrazana (land of the ancestors), including childbirth and the reburial
of ancestral bones on that land (Keller 2008), imply, however, that they
occur on their own, not rented, land.
Table 8 Association between population growth and commercial-crop expansion, 1987–97
Types 1 and 2 Types 3 and 4













Slow Grw. 9 19 28 Slow Grw. 23 11 34
Rapid Grw. 4 28 32 Rapid Grw. 24 43 67
Total 13 47 60 Total 47 54 101
Pearson’s Chi-Square=3.395 p=0.65 Pearson’s Chi-Square=9.2 p=0.002













PA. Stable 6 18 24 PA. Stable 20 13 33
PA Incr. 7 29 36 PA Incr. 27 41 68
Total 13 47 60 Total 47 54 101
Pearson’s Chi-Square=0.26 p=0.61 Pearson’s Chi-Square=3.9 p=0.048
FAM Family (land management unit), Rapid Grw. Families increasing in raw population by 3 or more between 1987 and 1997, P.A. Incr. Families
increasing in adult population (over 16 years) by 1 or more between 1987 and 1997, CP Commercial plants, Yes CP Expansion Families increasing
number of commercial plants by 200 or more between 1987 and 1997
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Finally, sociocultural norms that ensure food security may
impede market expansion when markets undermine that secu-
rity (Hyden 1980). In some cases, the right to minimum sub-
sistence develops into a broader Bmoral economy,^ with fam-
ily and village-level networks, institutions, and systems of
reciprocity acting as shock absorbers during crises (Scott
1976). Evidence of such a norm can be found in Andapa
where all family members inherit land, no family member
can be denied access to family land for tavy, and family mem-
bers can request and expect help from richer family members
in times of distress. It is not directly apparent, however, that
full-market production would threaten this norm. Even in
multi-household families, in which such a norm would be
expected to have the greatest impact, commercial crops pull
relatively little land out of the family land pool. One house-
hold’s commercial crop expansion would not detract from
another household’s subsistence security. Also, commercial
crops actually strengthen a family’s subsistence security as
they are less susceptible to environmental risk and generate
greater wealth.
Another cultural norm to ensure subsistence security,
less noted in the literature, may reside in the social rela-
tions of property—a concept articulated by Ferguson
(1985, 1990) but never applied to the question of the per-
sistence of self-provisioning. In the Andapa case, rice pro-
duction, and hence tavy, may serve as a form of subsistence
security because the social norms dictating how rice can be
used are substantially more restrictive than those for
Bliquid capital^ (i.e., cash generated from commercial
crops). Beyond basic needs, cash is vulnerable to personal
consumption splurges and several culturally-embedded ex-
penditures, such as acts of generosity and hospitality that
promote sociality and are believed to engender future pros-
perity, as well as an acceptance of ‘daring’ (irresponsible)
consumption among youth (Walsh 2003). In contrast, rice
cannot easily be sold for any reason. Fully substituting tavy
with commercial-crop revenues would place the entire
family budget into a realm of property with social rules
that permit or even promote its depletion but few that tem-
per its use.
This explanation is consistent with four observed behaviors
in Andapa, First, some individuals spent commercial crop
revenues on unwise purchases but never sold their tavy for
such purchases.9 Second, families regularly depleted their
commercial crop revenues to meet household needs (e.g.,
school fees, clothing, medical expenses and funeral ceremo-
nies), but once the money ran out, they never sold tavy to meet
those needs. They did without. Third, extended family
members in distress requested and received cash, but never
rice, from wealthier family members. Finally, one family ex-
plained that they had no money to take their dying child to a
doctor, even though their rice stores were full. Self-
provisioning (tavy) appears to be a socially acceptable place
to render at least some capital illiquid and ensure subsistence
security.
This assessment is consistent with other studies in Africa
(e.g., Gugerty 2007; Baland et al. 2011) and elsewhere (e.g.,
Banergee and Duflo 2011) that illustrate a variety of strategies
used to maintain some assets in parts of a portfolio that protect
them from personal consumption splurges or from the extend-
ed family and community demands. 10 This reserve ensures, at
most, minimum subsistence. It does not facilitate the accumu-
lation of wealth. Importantly, this norm could explain why
Type 1 and 2 families (high comm.) resist full immersion
into the market, but it cannot explain why Type 3 and 4
families (low comm.) produce commercial crops below their
capacity.
Conclusions and Implications
Our results do not support the exogenous thesis of why
Andapa farmers maintained self-provisioning over the period
of study. Despite market imperfections and risk, full-market
immersion appears to have been more profitable than dual
production, except in the case of coffee-dependent farmers
in Betsomanga. Nor do farmers face land or labor constraints,
even in the most marginalized cases.
Our results do support an endogenous interpretation, but
none of the explanations typically associated with this thesis
prove relevant to the Andapa case. Subsistence pressures ap-
pear to be pushing Type 3 and 4 farm families (low comm.)
into the market, as anticipated by induced-intensification, but
the thesis fails to account for levels of production that are far
below apparent capacity. Nor does induced intensification ex-
plain why Type 1 and 2 families (high comm.) clearly pursue
the market yet resist full immersion.
A stronger case can be made for the view that a cultural
norm residing in subsistence security is impeding them (at least
Type 1 and 2 families) from full-market immersion. Yet, the
typical assumption embedded in this view—that commercial
crops compete with and undermine more reliable and
9 Brown (2009) describes spending splurges in neighboring Antalaha on
items such as stereo systems and expensive tennis shoes during the 2003/
4 spike in vanilla prices, making them vulnerable to the price crash in
2005.
10 Baland et al. (2011) describes farmers who hide their own cash and
take loans from banks (paying costly interest) because it is easier for them
to refuse demands from family members on their borrowed cash than to
protect their own cash from those demands. Gugerty (2007) describes
ROCAs in Africa (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations where indi-
viduals agree to a schedule of periodic payments in return for a lump-sum
payment at a future date) that exist even where formal banking institutions
are available because ROCAs are more acceptable than banks as a place
to render capital illiquid.
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accessible subsistence crops—does not resonate in Andapa.
Instead, this study links adherence to self-provisioning to an
institution that has not yet been applied to this question – the
social relations of property.While the evidence is not definitive,
if this interpretation is correct, self-provisioning in Andapa
produces a secure asset to deposit in a socially-sanctioned bank-
ing system, withdrawn by consumption of the farm family
alone.
Further research is needed to fully develop and verify this
hypothesis. If correct, the implications are significant for Mal-
agasy development and environmental policy. To date,
policymakers have focused on encouraging commercial ex-
pansion through market liberalization. Environmental NGOs
expected this transition to launch subsistence substitution.
Farmers would replace tavy with vanilla and coffee in pursuit
of higher market rewards and in turn reduce land pressure on
the nearby nature reserves (WWF-Madagascar 2012). It hasn't
worked. Liberalization has spurred commercial production
but fallen short of supplanting self-provisioning.
We hypothesize that this failure stems in part from the
fact that liberalization policies do not address the social
relations of property as they affect subsistence security.
More recently, policymakers have been targeting the lack
of credit and savings institutions in the region, but ap-
pear to misread the actual role that those institutions may
need to play (e.g., IFAD 2012). Policy documents high-
light the need for savings cooperatives to provide a safe-
ty net in low-price years and reduce unwise consumption
splurges (IFAD 2012). The first reason is appropriate,
although in fewer cases than may be appreciated, given
the results reported here. The second reason only partial-
ly addresses pressures on cash, which runs deeper than
personal splurges. If savings accounts are to replace the
protective role that tavy plays they must be culturally
sanctioned in the way that tavy holds subsistence rice.
Strengthening the social rules concerning cash may also
have negative tradeoffs, possibly undermining the impor-
tant role that cash plays in alleviating subsistence risk at
the extended family level. A single savings account,
within a single property domain, may not be able to
uphold the very different roles that the two traditional
property domains, tavy and cash, currently play.
The persistence of swidden across the tropical world con-
tinues to attract interest, with many studies highlighting con-
ditions similar to those in Andapa, where land pressures and
economic conditions favor more intensive and commercial
cultivation (e.g., Sulistyawati et al. 2005; Mertz et al. 2013;
Van Vliet et al. 2013). Few, if any, address endogenous factors
before concluding that exogenous constraints are inhibiting
full-market immersion – especially among more marginalized
households (e.g., Schmook et al. 2013). Our research suggests
that endogenous factors, including the social relations of prop-
erty, need to be considered.
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